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Letters
JUDGING FOREIGN JUDGES BADLY:
NOSE COUNTING ISN'T ENOUGH
By John H. Langbein
In the Summer 1978 issue of The Judges' Journal, a
pair of researchers published an article purporting to
bring the lessons of comparative study to bear upon
the question of whether Americans devote adequate
resources to their court system. The authors, Earl
Johnson and Ann Drew, announced their conclusion
in the title: "This Nation Has Money for Everything-
Except Its Courts." 1 Statistical evidence from "anal-
ogous industrial democracies,"2 especially West Ger-
many (one of "the two most economically analogous
countries studied,"3) brought Johnson and Drew to
decide that "it may be that the American judicial
system ... is currently being sabotaged by an inade-
quate public investment."4
The purpose of this article is to show that no such
conclusion can be drawn from the evidence that
Johnson and Drew report. My main point is that the
authors have undertaken their comparison of Amer-
ican and European legal systems on a purely quanti-
tative basis, disregarding the qualitative differences
between our adversarial and the Europeans' nonad-
versarial procedures. These qualitative differences are
the true source of the quantitative differences. John-
son and Drew derived erroneous implications for the
manning of American courts because they ignored
those characteristics of European procedure that ex-
plain European manpower levels.
The Findings. Here are the main findings reported
by Johnson and Drew. They emphasize West German
data in their article; for simplicity I shall limit my
remarks to the German data.
(1) Judges: "The U.S. Judiciary seems to be under-
manned relative to that in several comparable juris-
dictions. For example, U.S. jurisdictions employed
only one-third as many judges, per capita, as West
Germany .... "5
(2) Lawyers: "Compared with foreign systems, the
U.S. judiciary appears overwhelmed statistically by
the size of the legal profession which constitutes one
of its major 'input' (case generating) factors. The
number of practicing lawyers for each judge in Cali-
fornia is more than ten times West Germany's ...
ratio.... "6
(3) Money: "The U.S. Judiciary also appears un-
derfinanced relative to several jurisdictions. Over the
period studied, the United States spent about half as
much on its courts per capita as West Germany .... "7
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What Judges Do. The authors' premise in making
these extrapolations from German to American data
is that the two legal systems are what they call "com-
parable jurisdictions."B For Johnson and Drew, a
judge is a judge-no matter where he works or what
he does-which is why they think to use German judi-
cial manpower figures to show that Americans are
"undermanned. "9
In truth, the judicial function changes radically
when we move from adversarial to nonadversarial pro-
cedural systems. In a nonadversarial system like the
German, the bench has a more active (and time-con-
suming) role in the handling of litigation, and it is
this-rather than German fiscal munificence-that
explains the size of the German judicial corps.
German CivU Procedure. American civil procedure
places upon the lawyers for the parties-our so-called
adversaries-the tasks of gathering evidence, shaping
the issues and presenting the evidence. Our lawyers
conduct pretrial discovery, select and prepare wit-
nesses, and examine and cross-examine at trial. We
expect our judges to exercise important checks upon
the conduct of the adversaries in pretrial and espe-
cially in trial procedure, but the responsibility for pro-
pulsion and the vast preponderance of the workload
remains with the litigants' lawyers.
The German system, by contrast, allocates to the
court the primary role in gathering the evidence and
shaping the litigation. There is no litigant-conducted
discovery procedure, indeed German law does not
even recognize our division between pretrial and trial
procedure. The German system does not expect its
lawyers (in the phrase of a splendid English-language
account of German civil procedure) to go "quarrying
for the facts. It is the judges, primarily, who conduct
the proof-takings.... "10 The court's investigation,
guided by the motions of the parties, extends across a
series of hearings-as many as the court finds neces-
sary in order to frame the issues and to establish the
facts. The court carefully records the results of these
hearings in the official file that it keeps for the case.
A case that goes to judgment requires the court to pre-
pare a full written opinion of law and fact; the Ger-
mans have no counterpart to the American civil jury,
hence no general verdict to spare the court the work of
opinion writing.
In so brief a summary I have already said enough
about German civil procedure for the reader to see
why it is preposterous for Johnson and Drew to claim
(Please turn to page 6)
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that American and German judicial manpower statis-
tics are drawn from "comparable jurisdictions." The
real reason that the Germans need more judges is the
same reason that they need fewer lawyers: their civil
procedure assigns to the judiciary much of the work-
load that we leave to private counsel.
Collegiality and Appeal. German civil procedure
shares with the other Continental nonadversarial sys-
tems two further characteristics that dictate higher
levels of judicial manpower. First, in cases above a
relatively low jurisdictional amount, currently 3,000
marks or about $1,600, II the German first-instance
bench is collegial. A panel of three professional judges
sits on each case (although one of the three custom-
arily takes a more active role in the caseI2 ). In a sys-
tem that does not have a civil jury trial, it is easy to
un~erstand why such a safeguard has been thought
deSirable, even though the cost in judicial resources is
significant.
Another notable characteristic of Continental pro-
cedure is the extreme liberality of appeal. The Ger-
man rule in civil matters (which is also applied to the
largest portion of the criminal caseloadl3 ) is that the
first-instance judgment is subject to full review de
novo, with the taking of new evidence allowed. 14
Needless to say, a system that so encourages appeal is
required to maintain appellate benches that are enor-
mous by our standards. IS
The "Bottleneck." The Johnson and Drew article
makes no mention of these traditional Continental
practices of collegial first-instance staffing and lib-
eral appellate review. The authors relegate to a foot-
note their admission that on account of procedural
(and substantive-law) differences, "Judges may play
a larger role and spend more time on each case in
a country like West Germany than in the United
States. "16 Astonishingly, the authors dismiss these
differences by likening them to those "among states
within the United States. "17
This insistence on treating European data as
though it arose in American contexts leads the
authors to mishandle their figures on the numbers of
European lawyers. Their premise is that legal systems
as disparate as the American and the German should
somehow be expected to have constant per capita law-
yer populations. Accordingly, when the authors dis-
cover that the number of practicing lawyers per judge
in California is ten times that in West Germany,t8
they infer that the American judiciary is being "over-
whelmed" by the lawyers, who are seen as " 'input'
(case generating) factors,"19 These disproportionate
lawyerly "inputs" must be leading to a "bottleneck"20
in the courts.
What Lawyers Do. Part ofthe reason why this infer-
ence is fallacious has already been set forth. Amer-
icans allocate the workload in civil (and criminal)
6
procedure differently; when lawyers rather than
judges do the basic investigative and forensic work in
the legal system, more lawyers and fewer judges will
be required than in a nonadversarial system like the
German.
Johnson and Drew also ignored another factor that
bears on the question of why the American legal sys-
tem needs more practicing lawyers per capita than the
German: Americans make somewhat larger use of pri-
vate lawyers in preventive law. For example, will
drafting and estate administration, which we think of
as basic lawyerly functions, are rarely handled by law-
yers in Germany, because of a variety of differences in
the procedural and substantive law of testation. 21
Similarly, in American business practice lawyers play
a more central role in shaping and drafting transac-
tions than do Continental commercial lawyers. For
such reasons, said a Belgian law professor to an audi-
ence of New Yorkers, "Of all countries, the United
States is the lawyers' paradise. "22
Case Duration. Another reason why Johnson and
Drew fail in attempting to extrapolate an American
"bottleneck" from German data is that they do not
adjust for differences in the ways that the two legal
systems define and dispatch their caseloads. For ex-
ample, Johnson and Drew compute that "California's
rate of dispositions per judge in 1975"23 was 20 times
that of West Germany, or six times if automobile-
related offenses are set aside. However, this notion of
"disposition per judge" conceals a host of variables.
Thus, the authors admit, but do not correct for, the
fact that the Europeans tend to handle in specialized
courts or nonjudicial tribunals matters that we pro-
cess as lawsuits in our ordinary courts. The footnote
that contains this admission invites readers to console
themselves with the thought that something called the
"law of large numbers" will cause these differences to
"cancel themselves out.... "24 The authors also ig-
nore differences in criminal procedures: American
courts still process a host of petty and regulatory of-
fenses that the Germans have long since decriminal-
ized;25 and American figures, which reflect our much
higher rates of serious crime,26 are deeply distorted by
the pretrial diversion and plea bargaining process that
is so strongly suppressed in West Germany.17
In contrast, West Germany's nonadversrial proce-
dure in both the civil and the criminal process appears
extraordinarily efficient by comparison with our own.
German law neatly avoids the profligacy of our
discovery procedures; it knows no real counterpart to
our complex motion practice and our law of evidence'
and it taxes the costs of civil litigation (including at:
torney fees) in a manner meant to give constant incen-
tive to litigants to abandon hopeless causes. 28
Learning from Others. I hope that the message of
this article will not be mistaken. I do not mean to say
that Americans have nothing to learn from the study
of comparative legal institutions. I have elsewhere em-
phasized my belief that we can find suggestive models
(Please turn to page 50)
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need for different methods to handle them becomes
more evident.
To a certain extent the danger that use of some sort
of independent expert to investigate scientific matters
would unduly sway the trier of fact at trial can be
mitigated by permitting thorough cross-examination
of the persons or groups that have conducted the in-
quiry. The efficacy of the procedure would then de-
pend in large measure upon the skillfulness of the
cross-examination. Whether that dependence would
be so great as to be unacceptable is a question that
can only be decided by experimentation with new pro-
cedures.
The chief danger of the various newly proposed
methods of handling scientific issues at trial-alI of
which involve to some degree an independent investi-
gation of scientific issues-is that the independent in-
vestigations will be given undue weight and may unac-
ceptably displace social judgment with scientific judg-
ment. If a trial jury is presented with a decision of, let
us say, a court-appointed panel of scientific experts,
they may alIow the scientific judgment of that panel to
take the place of the fundamentalIy social judgment
they must make, and thereby relinquish their essential
decision making function.
There are safeguards that can help prevent such a
result. For instance, reports of special masters or
court-appointed experts or reports from a science
court could be carefully stripped of all value or social
judgments, so that only purely scientific data remains.
The problem, of course, is that the line between pre-
sentation of data and evaluation of it is a hazy one.
Moreover, mere presentation of data without some
sort of evaluation would be of little help to a jury com-
posed at least in part of nonscientists. Thus the dan-
ger of replacing scientific judgment with social judg-
ment in the courtroom is a real one, and new methods
of treating technical issues at trial must be carefully
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for the reform of American procedure in the sophisti-
cated and efficient traditions of Continental law.29 My
point is that Johnson and Drew have not studied the
Continental systems in a reasonable way.
Johnson and Drew have falIen victim to the cardinal
error of comparative legal studies, the one that will
doom any comparative inquiry. They have neglected
to look at the contexts from which they have drawn
their comparative data, and thus inevitably they have
misunderstood and misapplied the data. Armed with
federal grant money, they have produced recommen-
dations that will doubtless be familiar in the corridors
where federal grant money is distributed: the way to
solve the problems of the legal system is to spend more
tax money and hire more personnel. However justified
drawn to reduce that danger as far as is practicable.
My point, though, is not to weigh the relative merits
of various procedures for producing scientific evi-
dence for trial, but simply to point out both the need to
consider new proposals and some ofthe potential dan-
gers they create. I suspect that there are workable
methods for handling scientific issues at trial that
would be more efficient than the traditional use of op-
posing experts. I think that such new methods should
be welcomed, but only with a cautious eye toward the
preservation of the critical role of the nonexpert judge
or jury in the process of judicial decision making. The
best way to learn about the efficacy of new methods of
treating scientific issues is by careful experimentation.
While our society is increasingly governed by and
dependent upon science and technology, most govern-
mental decisions remain social decisions. In the court-
room, no matter how technical the dispute, the judge
or jury is nearly always called upon to make a decision
of an essentially social nature. Hence these decisions
must not be made the exclusive province of the scien-
tific community. Science, of course, must provide the
informational basis for inteIligent decision making
and, in a sense, we must all be scientists in order to
deal inteIligently with questions of policy. We must
therefore be receptive to new and different methods of
resolving disputes that involve scientific issues, so long
as we do not sacrifice the inestimably important role
of the jury and, in some cases, judges, as the spokes-
persons of social judgment.
The effort to arrive at a just truth and to arrive at a
scientific fact-the product of an internally consistent
but externalIy perceived construct-are often quite
different. Holmes put it well:
I use to say, when I was young, that truth was
the majority vote of that motion that could
lick all others. [Holmes: Natural Law, 32
fuRY. L. REv. 40.1 ttt-
such recommendations might or might not ultimately
be, they are wholly unsupported by the comparative
study from which the authors purport to derive them.
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Except Its Courts, 17 JUDGES' J. (No.3, Summer 1978) at 8. [Here-
after cited as Johnson & Drew.]
2. ld. at 9.
3. ld. at 10.
4. ld. at 56.
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ATIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: GERMANY 82-85 (1977).
14. See generally Kaplan, von Mehren, & Schaefer, Phases of
German Civil Procedure II, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1443, 1443-61
(1958).
15. The German judiciary cannot be divided into tirst·instance
and appellate personnel for statistical purposes as easily as ours
can, because the Landgericht-the court of first instance in more
substantial civil and criminal matters-is also the court that con-
ducts review de novo proceedings for the less serious cases that
originate in the local court (Amtsgericht). Nevertheless, published
statistics do hint at the dimensions of German appellate judicial
staffing. For example, at the state supreme court (Oberlandes-
gericht) level, which is exclusively appellate, there were as of Jan-
uary 1978 some 340 civil chambers and 71 criminal chambers (for a
country with one quarter the U.S. population). Statistisches Bunde-
samt, Statistisches Jahrbuch 1978 fuer die Bundesrepublik
Deutschland 321 (table 15.1) (1978). These totals also do not in-
clude the appellate chambers in the federal supreme court
(Bundcsgerichtshof).
16. JOHNSON & DREW 56 n. 4.
17.ld.
18. ld. at 10.
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since 1973, it seems reasonable to anticipate that by
1979 the ratio of practicing lawyers to judges in the
United States must be considerably above the 20-to-1
mark, perhaps exceeding 25-to-l in many jurisdic-
tions. Unless one assumes that none of these new law-
yers are engaged in litigation or that there is no rela-
tion between the number of lawyers and the number
of disputes that will become lawsuits, it would seem
that the burgeoning size of the American legal profes-
sion (relative to the size of the judiciary) does con-
tribute some to backlog, delay, etc., in the courts.
At another point Langbein asserts that "Europeans
tend to handle in specialized or non-judicial tribunals
matters that we process as lawsuits in our ordinary
courtS."13 This is undoubtedly true. However, it is
also true that in the United States many disputes are
handled in specialized courts or non-judicial tribunals
that would go through regular courts in West Ger-
many or other European countries. Workers' compen-
sation tribunals, welfare fair hearing boards, and
thousands of administrative agency hearing officers
decide literally millions of disputes in the United
States. Many of these categories would end up in the
Labor Courts or Social Courts. He also indicates that
. the American figures are "deeply distorted by the pre-
trial diversion and plea bargaining process that is so
strongly suppressed in West Germany."14 But might
not the American system's reliance on plea bargaining
to dispose of so many criminal cases be a symptom, in
part at least, of a court system asked to dispose of too
many criminal cases? To pose the question another
way, would West German courts continue to "strongly
suppress"15 plea bargaining if their caseload were
suddenly doubled or tripled or expanded sixfold
without any increase in judicial manpower or budget?
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(E. Halbach, ed.) (ABA Section of Real Property, Probate and
Trust Law) (1977). German savings banks distribute pamphlets ad-
vising their customers on how to draft and execute their own wills,
e.g., "Checkliste: Der geregelte Nachlass" (Frankfurt Sparkasse
1822) (1978).
22. van Heeke, A Civilian Looks at the Common-Law Lawyer, in
INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS: CHOICE OF LAW AND LANGUAGE 5, 8
(W. Reese ed.) (Parker School Studies in Foreign and Comparative
Law) (1962).
23. JOHNSON & DREW 11.
24. ld. 56 n. 5.
25. See Langbein, Controlling Prosecutorial Discretion in Ger-
many, 41 1. CHl. L. REV. 439, 451·52 (1974).
26. See Langbein, supra note 13, at 110-111.
27. See Langbein, supra note 26, at 448-467.
28. See KAPLAN, et al., supra note 10, at 1232·37; KAPLAN, et al..
supra note 14, at 1461-66.
29. E.g., Langbein, Torture and Plea Bargaining, 46 U. CHI. L.
REV. 3, 21-22 (1978).
If Langbein was attempting to establish that, on the
average, cases disposed of by West German courts are
six times more complex than the ones that go through
American courts, it would take more proof than he
has offered. In one breath he reminds us that Ger-
many has decriminalized a "host of petty and regula-
tory offenses"16 (that is "simple" cases) that are still
handled by the courts in the United States (presum-
ably at rather little cost in time and money). Yet in the
next breath he suggests that America has a much
higher rate of "serious" crime than Germany which
presumably would place a greater demand on Amer-
ica's judicial resources. 17
On the other hand, that there are significant dif-
ferences in the composition and weighted significance
of the caseloads between the United States and West
Germany (or for that matter between Los Angeles and
San Francisco) is beyond dispute. But which way
those differences cut in comparing American and
German caseloads per judge is not apparent on the
surface. It may even be possible that American judges
are asked not only to dispose of a larger caseload but
of a larger caseload of more difficult cases than their
West German counterparts.
Langbein exposes the obvious issue without pres-
enting any convincing evidence that German judges,
on the average, confront vastly more serious and com-
plex disputes. It would require an enormous amount
of very sophisticated research to provide a document-
ed answer to this question. But in the meantime these
comparative caseload ratios tend to suggest that Ger-
many's higher expenditures on the courts cannot be
explained away by a bigger caseload. Beyond that, it
is interesting to note that the higher ratios of case-
loads per judge in the United States are accompanied
by higher ratios of private lawyers per judge, higher
police expenditures per judge, larger numbers of pro-
secutors per judge, etc. 18
